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REPORTS OF CASES
DETERMINED IN

THE SUPREME COUR T
OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
[39 C .2d 1; 243 P.2d 789]

[Sac. No. 6139. In Bank. May 71 1952.]

R. L. EBERHARDT et al., Appellant s, v. ARTHUR C.
BASS et al., Respondents.
[1] Chattel Mortgages-Construction and Operation-Crop Mortgage.-Defendant's interest as mortgagee of lessee's asparagus
crops growing and to be grown through the 1955 season does
not expire on termination of the lease for lessee's default
where a subordination agreement, signed by plaintiffs as
lessors, specifically states that all claims of plaintiffs against
,lessee, which could include a rig;ht to terminate the lease, and
all plaintiffs' interest in or claim against any of the asparagus
crops, which may reasonably embrace the right to crops to
be grown that plaintiffs would acquire by terminating the
lease, are subject and subordinate to defendant's rights against
lessee under any crop contract or mortgage to have the crops
to be grown as security for the debt owed by lessee to defendant.
[2a, 2b] !d.-Construction and Operation-Crop Mortgage.-Where
a subordination agreement, signed by lessors entitled to receive from lessee a rental of one-fourth of all crops grown
during tenancy, gives defendant the right to exercise· all of
its rights under nny crop mortgage, if lessee should breach the
lease, the same as if the lease had not been breached, and
permits it to take possession of all crops and dispose of them
[1] See Cal.Jur., Chattel Mortgages, § 21; Am.Jur., Chattel
Mortgages, § 134.
McK. Dig. References: [1-5, 81 9] Chattel Mortgages,§ 49; [6, 7]
Crops, § 3.
( 1)
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for the "term of said lease" provided it abides by the lease,
the quoted words do not necessarily mean that if the lease was
terminated such rights would cease, but may mean that such
rights might be exercised for the period covered by the lease.
[3] !d.-Construction and Operation-Crop Mortgage.-Where a
subordination agreement, signed by lessors entitled to receive
from lessee a rental of one-fourth of all crops grown during
tenancy, expressly provides that if the realty should be relet,
sublet, sold or encumbered before the rights of defendant
under a crop mortgage terminate, the lessors agree that any
new lease and any deed or other conveyance shall recognize
the agreement subordinating lessee's right to defendant's rights
under the crop mortgage, the inference is that a termination
of the original lease is not to end defendant's rights.
[4] !d.-Construction and Operation-Crop Mortgage.-A provision in a subordination agreement, signed by lessors entitled
to receive from lessee a rental of one-fourth of all crops grown
during tenancy, that if defendant takes possession in the
exercise of its rights under a crop mortgage after lessee has
breached the lease it must perform the terms of the lease while
in possession, may reasonably indicate defendant's duties if
it chooses to take possession as an alternative means of protecting its superior rights under the agreement subordinating
lessee's right to defendant's rights under the crop mortgage,
and not as a restriction on those rights if it does not choose
to take possession.
[6] !d.-Construction and Operation-Crop Mortgage.-A provision in a subordination agreement, signed by lessors entitled
to receive from lessee a rental of one-fourth of all crops grown
during tenancy, that lessee's interest in the crops might be
sold or mortgaged to defendant, while some indication that
only such i.nterest might be sold or mortgaged and that on
termination of the lease there would be no interest to mortgage
or sell, does not necessarily negative that part of the agreement subordinating lessee's right to defendant's rights under
a crop mortgage, nor conclusively show that the crop to be
grown was not to be subject to the indebtedness for as long
as the term and renewal period of the lease.
[Sa, 6b-] Crops-Sales-Contracts-Construction and Operation.Contracts signed by lessors and lessee stating that they have
"sold" to defendant all the asparagus to be grown on the
leased property during the seasons of 1947 to 1955 do not
terminate with termination of the lease for lessee's default,
although a letter written by defendant's counsel during the
preliminary negotiations referred to the purchase of the crops
to be grown during the term of the lease, where the contracts
are expressly made to run to 1955, and where a subordination
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agreement, executed at the same time and signed by lessors,
specifically states that all claims of lessors against lessee are
subject and subordinate to defendant's rights against lessee
under any crop mortgage to have the crops to be grown as
security for the debt owed by lessee to defendant.
[7] !d.-Sales-Contracts-Construction and Operation.-Asserted
ambiguities in contracts of sale of lessee's asparagus crops,
such as that lessors, who were entitled to receive only onefourth of the crops during tenancy, could not have been the
seller of the crop and pass title thereto when they did not
have it, and the statement that there were no encumbrances
on the crops when there were, does not compel the court to
ignore the clear and positive provisions of the contracts that
lessors and lessee have sold to defendant all the asparagus to
be gi'own on the leased property through the 1955 season.
[8] Chattel Mo1'tgages-Construction and Operation-Crop Mortgage.-Where a crop mortgage embracing 75 per cent of the
"crops of asparagus to be grown" by lessee on leased property
was assigned to defendant, and lessors, who were entitled to
25 per cent of all crops grown during tenancy, signed a
subordination agreement specifically stating that all claims of
lessors against lessee were subject to and subordinate to
defendant's rights against lessee under any crop contract or
mortgage to have the crops to be grown as security for the
debt owed by lessee to defendant, and both lessors and lessee
signed contracts selling to defendant all the asparagus to be
groWn on the leased property through the 1955 season, it is
proper to decree that defendant may retain 75 per cent of the
amounts to be paid by it for asparagus under the contracts
until it has been reimbursed for the mortgaged indebtedness.
[9] Id. - Construction and Operation- Crop Mortgage.-A refinancing arrangement consisting of defendant's mortgage of
lessee's asparagus crop, a subordination agreement signed by
lessors subordinating their claims against lessee to defendant's
rights against lessee under any crop contract or mortgage
to have the crops to be grown as security for the debt owed
·b y lessee _to defendant, and contracts of sale by lessors and
lessee making defendant the owner of the asparagus crops to
be grown on the leased property through the 1955 season, is
not unfair and unconscionable and a lien may be equitably
imposed to enforce such arrangement beyond the terms of
the lease whete, looking at the whole transaction, the lessors
received value, it _a ppearing that the original indebtedness
was incurred to establish the asparagus crop, of which lessors
were to rec11ive. 25 per -cent, and that by the refinancing ar.r&.!lge:!Ae~~ the debt beca~e less and the contracts were made
to assure lessors and lessee of a certain market.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Joaquin County. George F. Buck, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to quiet title to land and crops. Judgment that
plaintiffs owned land, and that defendant corporation owned
crops to be grown in accordance with contracts and had lien
on crops and on land, affirmed.
Rutherford, Jacobs, Cavalero & Dietrich, D. R. Jacobs and
William H. Woodward for Appellants.
Price, MacDonald & Knox, Mazzera, Snyder & DeMartini
and Wallace W. Knox for Respondents.
CARTER, J.- In 1943, Empire Tract Company, as owner
and lessor, leased to R. C. MacLean, lessee, a tract of farm
land for the purpose of growing asparagus for a 10-year term,
commencing .January, 1943, with an option for two years
more; the rental was 25 per cent of the asparagus grown.
In 1943, MacLean planted asparagus. In 1944, MacLean, with
the consent of the lessor, assigned his lease to defendant,
Arthur C. Bass, who assumed MacLean's obligations under
the lease. In September, 1944, Bass, with the lessor's consent, gave a crop mortgage on the asparagus crop to Richmond-Chase Company, the latter having financed tlie planting
of the asparagus. In 1945, plaintiffs acquired title to the land
subject t o the lease. In 1947, Bass needed refinancing, which
was obtained from defendant, Stokely Foods, Inc., and the
rights and duties involved were set forth in agreements between the defendants and plaintiffs.
Upon a breach of the lease in 1949 by Bass, plaintiffs gave
notice to defendants, and the default not having been cured,
plaintiffs commenced the instant action against defendants
to quiet title to the land and crops and sought to have it
declared that defendants no longer had any interest in the
land or asparagus crop. Defendant Bass defaulted, but
Stokely asserted in detail its rights under the agreements.
The court decreed, as we construe it, that Stokely shall be
the owner of the asparagus crops to be grown through the 1955
season, when grown, in accordance with the asparagus contracts (hereafter mentioned) which were declared to be in full
force; that plaintiffs are the owners of the land; that Stokely
has a lien (to secure $47,893.19 due from Bass) on 75 per
cent of the crops to be grown through 1955; -that until the
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rights of Stokely under the subordination agreement (hereafter mentioned) and the asparagus contracts have terminated, any new lease or conveyance of the land shall be
subject to such agreements, and a lien is imposed upon the
land to that extent; that the liens are to exist until the
indebtedness is paid or 1955, whichever arrives first.
Plaintiffs appeal, urging two main contentions: That the
1947 agreement properly interpreted, as a matter of law,
does not alter the general rule that a termination by the
lessor of the lease for default, ended the security interest
of Stokely in the crops, and that if the agreement does alter
the rule, it is unconsciomible and unfair and should not have
been enforced in equity.
The · 1943 lease provided that the lessor shall receive as
''rental'' for the property 25 per cent of all asparagus crops
produced thereon during the term of the lease and renewals,
to be delivered on the premises, and lessor to bear 25 per cent
of the cost of packing the annual crop; lessee is to establish
the crop (which has a normal life of 10 to 12 years); time is
of the essence, and lessor may, upon 10 days' notice, terminate
the lease for a breach of any of its terms by lessee. The crop
mortgage to Richmond-Chase in 1944, embraced 75 per cent
of the ''crops of asparagus growing and to be grown,'' from
October, 1944, to June, 1955, and was to secure $40,000 and
further sums advanced and was consented to by the lessor ; as
a part of the transaction, MacLean assigned the lease to Bass
and was released from all liability under the lease and his
indebtedness to Richmond-Chase. An advance was made to
Bass under the mortgage and he borrowed money from a bank,
secured by his farm equipment during 1944-46. Finding
himself in financial difficulties in 1947, Bass, without any
participation by plaintiffs, approached Stokely to have it
refinance him; his indebtedness then amounted to about $72,000. Stokely was receptive, and its counsel, Mr. Knox, advised plaintiff, Eberhardt, by letter that Stokely would acquire the Richmond-Chase crop mortgage and would advance
Bass funds to pay the debt on the equipment; that in return
it wanted to buy from Bass all the cannllig asparagus grown
during the term of the lease ; and that proper documents for
its security and a new crop mortgage be made and a memorandum of the lease recorded. Enclosed were two proposed
contracts, one for the purchase of canning white asparagus
and tb,e other green asparagus, called asparagus contracts,
. also a ''Subordination Agreement.'' Eberhardt's counsel sug-
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gested changes in the latter agreement: (1) To the effect that
if Bass defaulted and Stokely entered the leased property,
Stokely would assume Bass' obligations, and (2) the lessors'
rental of 25 per cent of the crops be excepted from the agreement. The subordination agreement and canning asparagus
purchase contracts were signed by plaintiffs. Thereafter
Richmond-Chase assigned its mortgage to Stokely.
The subordination agreement recites that plaintiffs are
the owners of the land and of the lessors' interest in rentals
to become due under the lease which is in full force; and
that Stokely, under the terms of the agreement, is willing
to loan money to Bass to finance him in the asparagus project
under the lease. It then provided that in consideration of
the loan by Stokely to Bass, plaintiffs "[3] agree that all
claims of the [plaintiffs] against said . . . Bass, except for
rental as provided in said lease, and any and all of the [plaintiff's] interest in or to, or claims against, any of the asparagus crops, except for rental as provided in said lease, shall
be subject and subordinate to the claims of Stokely Foods,
Inc., against said [Bass] lessee and against said crops under
any crop contract and any crop mortgage the lessee [Bass]
. . . may execute and deliver to Stokely Foods, Inc., covering said asparagus a:p.d shall be subject and subordinate to
the claims of Stokely Foods, Inc., as assignee of RichmondChase Company, . . . under that certain crop mortgage executed by . . . Bass, dated September 30, 1944, . . . .
" [4] Should the lessee [Bass] breach or abandon said lease
or do or cause anything to be done whereby he might or
would lose possession of said land, the [plaintiffs] hereby
agree to permit Stokely . . . to exercise all rights which it
has under any crop contract andjor any crop mortgage as
if lessee had not breached said lease or had remained in
possession, as the case may be, and agree that Stokely . . .
will be permitted to take possession of said crops and dispose of them as provided in said crop contract and/or crop
mortgage for a period not exceeding the term of said lease,
provi~ed while Stokely . . . is in possession of the demised
premises it shall perform all of lessee's [Bass'] agreements
as set forth in said lease.
"[5] If said real property should be relet, sublet, sold or
encumbered before the rights of Stokely . . . under said contract or crop mortgage· terminate, the [plaintiffs] further
agree that any new lease to the same lessee or to any other
person and any deed or other conveyance or mortgage or
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deed of trust of said real property shall contain a provision
expressly recognizing the agreements herein provided for and
subordinating the right of the lessee or transferee to the
rights of Stokely . . . under any crop contract, any crop
mortgage, and hereunder.
'' [6) In said lease it is provided that lessors shall be entitled to receive 25% of all of the crops of asparagus produced on said land during the term of said lease as rental
and that lessor may elect to dispose of its said percentage
through lessee. The [plaintiffs] hereby agree that they have
this day sold their share of said crops of canning asparagur
to Stokely . . . and that they will not elect to permit lessee
to dispose of said canning asparagus.
"[7] The [plaintiffs] hereby consent to the assignment by
lessee of said lease to Stokely . . . for the purpose of securing any indebtedness of said ... Bass (including said Richmond-Chase crop mortgage) and the [plaintiffs] further consent to the sale and/or mortgage by said . . . Bass of his
interest therein to Stokely . . . of the canning asparagus
growing and to be grown upon the demised premises.
"[8] In the event lessee [Bass] defaults in any obligation
contained in said lease, before exercising any rights contained in said lease, the undersigned agree to give Stokely
. . . written notice thereof . . . and to give it ten days within
which to cure said default before exercising any right of
reentry, cancellation or termination of said lease, it being
understood that so long as said lease is assigned to Stokely
. . . the bap.kruptcy or insolvency of said . . . Bass shall
not be a ground for termination of said lease.''
In 1949, two years after the subordination agreement, Bass
having failed to operate the property as reqmred by the
lease, plaintiffs gave notice to him and Stokely of its termination. The default not being cured, plaintiffs entered into
possession of the property and commenced the instant action.
[1] Commencing with the premise that the interest of
a crop mortgagee under a mortgage on crops to be grown,
given by the lessee as mortgagor on the latter's share of the
crops, expires when the lease is terminated for the default
of the lessee, plaintiffs urge that the subordination agreement does not negative the application of that rule; that
therefore Stokely's interest was lost when the lease was
terminated for Bass' default and their title should have been
quieted against Stokely.
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The subordination agreement, as above seen, specifically
states that all claims of plaintiffs against Bass, which could
include a right to terminate the lease, and all plaintiffs' int erest in or claim aga-inst any of the asparagus crops, which
may reasonably embrace the right to crops to be grown that
plaintiffs would acquire by terminating the lease, are subject and subordinate, that is, inferior to Stokely's rights
against Bass under any crop contract or mortgage, that is,
the right to have the crops to be grown as security for the
debt owed by Bass to Stokely. [2a] In harmony with that
construction, and implementing it, Stokely is given the right
to exercise all of its rights under any crop mortgage, if Bass
should breach the lease, the same as if the lease had not been
breached, and may take possession of all crops and dispose
of them for the term of the lease, provided it abides by the
lease. While the expression that the rights under the contracts might be exercised for the term of the lease may be
susceptible of the meaning that if the lease was terminated
the rights would cease, it may also be susceptible of the
meaning that such rights might be exercised for the period
covered by the lease, 10 years plus two one-year renewals.
To that end plaintiffs must give Stokely notice of any breach
of the lease by Bass. This might indicate that Stokely's
rights are restricted to Bass' but not necessarily so by reason
of the other terms of the contracts. [3] Moreover, if conditions should change, such as a reletting, subletting, selling
or an encumbering before Stokely's rights under the crop
mortgage end, any such new arrangements should recognize
the rights of Stokely. A reletting m:eans a new ·lease which
embraces a termination of the Bass lease, hence the inference
is that the termination of the Bass lease is not to end
Stokely's rights.
Plaintiffs urge, however, that the changes made at their
request, in the subordination agreement, before its execution, shows a contrary intent. The first change was that
made in paragraph four. As proposed, it read, after the
last use of the word mortgage, ''during all of the years covered thereby,'' and the change in lieu of that provides as
it does ''for a period etc.'' They claim that the former
clause would cover the crops for the years to 1955 mentioned
in the crop mortgage, but the change fixed the period for
the term of the lease, which might be less if terminated
by plaintiffs. If their theory is correct that ordinarily a
crop mortgage dies with the lease, the originally proposed

I·
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words might not have the meaning they claim. [2b] As
above seen, the expression used, ''term of said lease,'' may
well mean the years expressed on its face as its life. [ 4] There
was also added to the paragraph the provision that if Stokely
did take possession it must perform the terms of the lease
while in possession. This may reasonably indicate Stokely's
duties if it chose to take possession as an alternative means
of protecting its superior rights given by the forepart of
the agreement and not as a restriction on those rights if it
did not choose to take possession.
[5] The second change, in paragraph seven, consisted of
the addition of the words "by Arthur C. Bass, of his interest
therein to Stokely" after the last use of the word mortgage.
There may be some indication that only Bass' interest in
the crops might be sold or mortgaged and thus when the lease
was terminated there would be no interest to mortgage or
sell, but it does not necessarily negative the forepart of the
lease. It may be that plaintiffs intended by this amendment
to prevent a holding out of themselves as guarantors of Bass
to the full extent of the crops, including their 25 per cent
as lessors, but it does not conclusively show that the crop
to be grown was not to be subject to the indebtedness for
as long as the 10-year term and renewal period of the lease.
[6a] Plaintiffs urge that the contracts (called asparagus
contracts) under 'vhich the asparagus crops were to be sold
to Stokely, terminated with the termination of the lease. As
heretofore shown, the subordination agreement recited that
while the lease provided that plaintiffs may elect to dispose
of their 25 per cent share of the crops through Bass, plaintiffs
agreed that they have "this day _sold their share" to Stokely.
The asparagus contracts were executed with the subordination agreement and signed by Bass, plaintiffs and Stokely.
They state that Bass and plaintiffs have "sold" and Stokely
"has bought for the season 1947 to 1955," inclusive, the
asparagus "which is growing or which" Bass and plaintiffs
agre(;l to grow upon the property. Detailed provisions are
made including a promise in paragraph seven that ''during
the life of" the contract, plaintiffs and Bass will cultivate
and care for the "asparagus beds" in a prudent manner.
The judgment declared 'the asparagus contracts to be in full
force and effect and Stokely to become the owner of the crops
to be grown. Plaintiffs urge that the court erred in decicling that Bass and plaintiffs sold the crop to Stokely because
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Bass, as lessee, had title to it under the lease and plaintiffs
were entitled to only 25 per cent thereof as rental (see Silveim v. Ohrn, 33 Cal.2d 272 [201 P.2d 387]) and therefore
it could not have been intended that Stokely was bound by
paragraph seven of the asparagus contracts. The language
in paragraph seven, however, is specific and clear as above
seen. Indeed, it may well be inferred, i:E plaintiffs 1 argument is accepted, that it was intended that plaintiffs must
abide by that paragraph at a time when Bass would no longer
have title to the crop, that is, after the lease was terminated,
thus indicating that the termination of the lease was not to
d~stroy Stokely's rights.
[7] Plaintiffs urge various other asserted ambiguities in
the asparagus contracts when read with the other instruments,
such as that plaintiffs could not have been the seller of the
crop al).d pass title thereto when they did not have it, and
the statement that there were no encumbrances on the crops
when there were. These factors do not compel us to ignore
the .clear and positive provisions of the contracts which are
reasonably susceptible of the interpretation placed thereon
by the trial court.
[6b] The contracts died with the lease, argue plaintiffs,
because the Knox letter written during the preliminary negotiations referred to the purchase of the crops to be grown
during the term of the lease. .As we have seen, however,
that is not the necessary construction of the subordination
agreement and the asparagus contracts are expressly made
to run to 1955.
[8] Plaintiffs claim the court erred in concluding that
Stokely may retain 75 per cent of the amounts to be paid
by it for asparagus under the asparagus contracts until it
has been reimbursed for Bass 1 indebtedness to it in the sum
of $47,893.19. This is the legal effect of the conclusion of
law in the judgment that Stokely ~:!as a lien on the crops to
secure .that indebtedness, and it follows that it should receive
the proceeds from the crops until it is paid.
[9] Plaintiffs assert that the refinancing arrangement consisting of the crop mortgage, subordination agreement and
asparagus contracts as interpreted by the trial court is unfair and unconscionable ; and that a lien cannot be equitably
imposed to enforce them . beyond the term of the lease because plaintiffs get nothing out of it and the benefits all lie
with Stokely. To that end they urge that Stokely gets: (1)
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The right to the asparagus crops to be grown under the
asparagus contracts; (2) Bass' promissory notes; ( 3) a crop.
mortgage on 75 per cent of the crops; (4) a discount on the
Bass indebtedness of $14,000; (5) a chattel mortgage on Bass'
farming equipment; ( 6) an assignment of Bass' lease ; and
(7) security rights under the subordination agreement. With
regard to (1) the contracts assured to plaintiffs the current
market price for the crops. As to Bass' notes, Stokely paid
the original mortgagee, Richmond-Chase, and any benefit
that would accrue by a reduction in the debt would be to
make the debt less. The assignment of the lease was something that came from Bass, not plaintiffs. The essence of
plaintiffs' argument seems to be that, as interpreted by the
court, the refinancing arrangement imposed upon the asparagus crop and property, liens for an obligation incurred by
MacLean and Bass, not plaintiffs, and for a period beyond
the termination of the lease for Bass' default; that for having
their property encumbered by that obligation they received
nothing. They did receive value, however, when we look
at the whole transaction. The original indebtedness was incurred to establish the perennial asparagus plants and bring
them to a producing stage. That was a benefit to plaintiffs'
land, rendering it productive of valuable crops of which they
were to receive 25 per cent. In 1947, by the refinancing arrangement, the debt became less and the asparagus contracts
were made to assure plaintiffs and Bass of a certain market.
Certainly plaintiffs 'were benefited by having a properly
financed lessee who would carry out the lease. When the
refinancing arrangement was made it may be assumed that
the parties believed the value of the crops would pay for
their care and cultivation and still leave a profit. The termination of the lease would not necessary alter that situation,
for it would only change the personnel of the one who cared
for and harvested the crops. If defendants performed that
function they would realize any profit Bass would have
made. The fact remains that the crops were assumed to be
!1 .benefit · to all concerned and they were made possible by
the ·money advanced.
· To ·plaintiffs' contention that the lien should not have
been imposed, it is clear from the foregC?ing disc~sion that
the prop~lj;y wa~ to be security for the indeptedness under
the· refinancing instruments. The court did· nothing more
than declare their effect.
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It is claimed that there is no allegation or finding that the
refinancing arrangement was fair and plaintiffs received
· Yalue. The transactions were fully set forth in Stokely's
pleadings and the findings of the court and 've do not see how
plaintiffs were prejudiced by failure to set forth more.
Judgment affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J ., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J.,
Schauer, J ., and Spence, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 22263.
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LYMAN D. PFINGSTEN, Respondent, v. ROBERT E.
WESTENHAVER, as Administrator, etc., Appellant.
[1] Conflict of Laws-Rules of Evidence.- Law of forum controls

the rules of evidence, including the question of its sufficiency.
[2] Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Sufficiency of Evidence.
-Where there is any evidence which sustains an implied
finding of the jury, its determination is final.
[3] Automobiles-Evidence-Collisions.-Evidence that automobile of defendant's decedent was traveling at a high rate
of speed on a treacherously icy highway, that brakes were
applied under conditions conducive to skidding, and that
the headlight beams of the automobile suddenly swung at
an angle to the previous line of travel and a collision with
plaintiff's tractor-trailer occ111·red, sustains implied finding of
jury that driver of automobile was negligent and that his
negligence was the cause of the collision.
[4] Evidence-Hearsay.-Testimony of plaintiff's witness as to
ownership o.f automobile which collided with plaintiff's tractortrailer may not be excluded as hearsay where the witness
testifies from · his own knowledge (Code Civ. Proc., § 1845) ,
a1;1d it does not appear how he acquired his knowledge.
[1] See Am.Jur., Conflict of Laws, § 203.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Conflict of Laws, § 2 ; [2] Appeal
nnd Error, § 1249; [3] Automobiles, § 222; [4] Evidence, § 236 ;
[5] Appeal and Error, § 1591; [6] Witnesses, § 281; [7] Automobiles, § 242; [8] Evidence, ·§ 457; [9] Evidence, § 453; [10, 11,
14, 16] Damages, § 182; [12] Automobiles, § 189-1; [13] Automobiles, § 272; [15, 17, 18, 20] Automobiles, § 360; [19] Automobiles, § 385-1; [21] Damages, § 171; [22] Trial, § 204; [23] Ap·
peal and Error, § 1713.

